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Freedom versus Security. Debates on Social Risks in 
Western Germany in the 1950s 
Meike Haunschild ∗ 
Abstract: »Freiheit versus Sicherheit. Die Debatte um soziale Risiken in West-
deutschland in den 1950ern«. The article outlines the debate on the expansion 
of the welfare state in Western Germany during the 1950s. This debate does 
not only provide important insights into the self-perception of Western Ger-
man society. It can also be read as a risk debate, because the contemporaries 
were aware of the ambivalent effects of the preventive measures against pov-
erty: While especially social democrats emphasised the stabilising effect of the 
fight against poverty on democracy, politicians from economic-liberal circles 
stressed the risk that such measures could give the state excessive power over 
its citizens. Despite the consensual conviction of all relevant political actors 
that an expansion of the welfare state was historically consequent and ex-
pected by the population, the weighing of individual freedom on the one hand 
and social security on the other hand coined the debate on, as well as the or-
ganisation of, the Western German welfare state. 
Keywords: Social risks, social security, welfare state, individual freedom. 
1.  Basic Social Rights and “Totalitäre Entartung“ 
At the beginning of the 1960s, the German sociologist Christian von Ferber 
argued that the standard risks of the poor working classes had lost the power to 
precipitate individuals into poverty. By “standard risks” he meant events which 
every individual could equally be effected by, and which typically caused a 
loss of income. According to von Ferber, these standard risks included sick-
ness, accidents, death of the provider, unemployment and inflation. In his opin-
ion, extensive measure in economic and social politics, such as the implemen-
tation of child allowance in 1954 or the pension reform of 1957, had brought 
the material impact of these risks under control. Even more: In his article von 
Ferber argued that in the highly industrialised areas of the world, everyone 
currently enjoyed basic social rights which granted them not only a range of 
free choice against material distress. These rights also implied the liberation 
from illiteracy and superstition as well as the restriction to physical work and 
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the suppression of intellectual potentials. Furthermore, von Ferber claimed that 
these basic social rights had been established as standard and goal for the ef-
forts of almost all peoples in the world (von Ferber 1962, 439).  
In the sociologist’s opinion, however, such a development towards an exten-
sion of basic rights for almost anyone was not purely positive, for it also im-
plied an increase in social disciplining and the manipulation of people’s behav-
iour through the state. Modern industrial society could bring with it certain 
unwanted social effects, not in the shape of material pressure, as it had been the 
case in pre-industrial societies, but in the shape of totalitäre Entartung, i.e. the 
society lapsing into totalitarian degeneracy. According to von Ferber, the only 
effective protection against this was democratic control. Contrary to the many 
voices in the public debate that considered individual freedom to be in danger in 
industrial society, von Ferber argued that resistance was generally possible in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. However, he demanded that citizens as well as 
politicians should not measure social institutions against the benchmark of tech-
nical perfection, i.e. they should not expect absolute social security. For if they 
did, the state’s social system might deprive individuals of their right to make 
free decisions and to act self-responsibly (von Ferber 1962, 439, 442, 445). 
Social risks versus security granted by the state, individual freedom versus 
basic human rights and solidarity – this was the conflict line which ran through 
almost all socio-political debates in the Federal Republic after the harshest 
post-war hardship had been overcome. This seemed to be the case from the 
middle of the 1950s, when unemployment decreased and economic growth was 
stable. With reference to Ulrich Beck’s concept of the “risk society” the article 
sees in this discussion elements of a modern risk debate. For the discussion 
revolves around the weighing up of risks: while the risk of poorness was re-
duced by means of social security measures, this modern problem-solving 
approach decreased individual freedom. So differently from what researchers 
assumed for a long period, risks did not disappear through the social production 
of wealth. Indeed, as Arwen P. Mohun already pointed out in her article in this 
HSR Special Issue, one outcome of modernity is the intention to “colonize the 
future,” which can be translated as the general wish to control risk. But at the 
same time, the social experts and politicians of the 1950s’ FRG were quite 
aware of the dilemma that progress could also produce negative consequences. 
2.  Risk as an Analytical Concept for the History of Post-
War Western Germany 
Currently, the scientific use of risk as an analytical concept is strongly influ-
enced by sociological reflections (Knutsen et al. 2012, 13). Niklas Luhmann 
distinguishes between “risk” and “danger.” He speaks of “risks” when an indi-
vidual can influence the possible negative consequences of his or her decisions. 
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Usually, the individual has to take the responsibility for such risks. When an 
individual is affected by the environment, however, Luhmann categorises this 
as a “danger” (Luhmann 1993, 327). However, in everyday speech people usual-
ly do not make this differentiation and treat “risk” and “danger” as synonymous 
terms. Hence, in historical analyses it is often hard to decide whether contempo-
raries regarded something as a risk or a danger in Niklas Luhmann’s sense. So 
Peter Itzen and Simone Müller argued in the introduction to this HSR Special 
Issue for a broad meaning of risk and defined risks as future events and develop-
ments that are caused by human actions and that are potentially harmful to human 
actors and their environment (Itzen and Müller 2016, 10, in this HSR Special 
Issue). Transferred to the subject of the article, falling into poverty in the 
1950s, FRG can be regarded as a risk because of the installation of a social 
security system. The same holds true for the loss of individual freedom. 
The notion of the “risk society,” introduced by Ulrich Beck in his 1986 book 
by the same title, very quickly became highly popular and an inspiration for 
further studies (Teufel 2001, 237). Subsequently, “risk” as an analytical con-
cept has spread into other research areas: at first, into the research on ecology 
and environmental risks. Today, it has been applied to such various fields as 
technology, economy and social sciences. Only in the last couple of years have 
historians introduced the concept into their field (Christmann and Ibert 2012, 
259; see also Mohun 2013). However, risk turns out to be a fruitful area of 
historical research, for the strategies of dealing with risks differ significantly in 
different regions, societies and eras (Christmann and Ibert 2012, 260; see also 
Itzen and Müller 2016, in this HSR Special Issue). 
Most scholars agree with Beck in so far as they argue that dangers and 
threats earlier societies were confronted with do not appear abruptly anymore 
in modern societies. In contrast, technical and scientific progress has made 
these dangers and threats calculable, which means they have been converted into 
risks (Münkler 2010, 18). Yet, differently from what researchers assumed for a 
long time, risks do not disappear through the social production of wealth. Schol-
ars agree that legal regulations and measures of social security have reduced 
“real” material need and, through this, mitigated the distributional conflict which 
had dominated industrial societies before. Yet, they argue that new risks have 
moved into the focus of interest, namely those which are unleashed by the pro-
cesses of modernisation themselves. Rather than progress, the involuntary pro-
duction of risks is now seen as the key characteristic of modern societies. Accord-
ing to Beck, this shift began in the 1970s in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
at the latest (Christmann and Ibert 2012, 260; Beck 1986, 25, 27). 
With the principle “need is hierarchical, smog is democratic,” Beck refers 
primarily to environmental risks that do not halt at class or state borders. At the 
same time, he refers to social risks by using the term “risk society.” Through 
the dissolution of traditional structures, individuals do not only gain more pos-
sibilities to shape their lives in a positive way. At the same time, “individuali-
HSR 41 (2016) 1  │  179 
sation” also implies that everyone can be hit by social descent. Thus, moderni-
sation itself becomes a problem (Beck 1986, 26, 48, 218 et seq.). But as I will 
argue in this article not only modernisation in a technological sense but from 
the point of view of the contemporaries also in a political one. For democracy 
and human rights also can be in danger by measures actually established to 
increase social security. 
The concept of “security,” often used as an antonym to the concept of risk, 
has been an expanding field of sociological and politological research since the 
attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 (Scherr 2010, 213, cf. Münkler 2010; 
Zwierlein and de Graaf 2013). At first sight, security and risk may appear to 
stand in contrast with one another. Yet, both approaches have the same goal, 
namely to avoid danger. In order to reach this goal, however, they pursue dif-
ferent, partly complementary paths. Security approaches attempt to create areas 
which are protected from dangers or which are, at least, significantly safer than 
their environment. Risk approaches develop strategies to make dangers and 
threats more calculable (Münkler 2010, 11). With this in mind Eckart Conze’s 
proposal to consider the history of the early FRG as a “search for security” can 
also be regarded as an input for the risk history of post-war Germany (cf. 
Conze 2009, 18). 
This article concentrates mainly on the second half of the 1950s. Thus, the 
period it investigates precedes the shift from an industrial society driven by the 
belief in progress to a so-called risk society identified by Beck by about two 
decades. But as early as the second half of the 1950s, contemporaries perceived 
the dissolution of traditional structures as a threat to social security. Additional-
ly, the previous decades with their economic crises, political unrest and wars 
had unsettled the people. The worst post-war hardship had been overcome, 
relieved through emergency aid programmes and the beginning economic 
growth. So welfare experts could now start to reflect on the role which the state 
should henceforth play in the precautions for its citizens’ social risks. In the 
following the central lines of argument of this debate will be described. There-
fore I will look primarily at speeches and articles on social policy from social 
experts of the two main parties of the FRG, namely the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Special attention is 
awarded to the debate about freedom versus security. At first sight, the opposi-
tion against the expansion of the social system seems to have had little, if any, 
effect. For the years of the Western German post-war boom are considered the 
period of the biggest expansion of the welfare state (see e.g. Ruck 2012). The 
intensity with which the debate was led in the course of several years, however, 
suggests that this was more than just an ideological conflict with the sole goal 
of defaming the political opponent. Rather, it seems that many people were 
afraid in the 1950s that the Federal Republic might turn out to be an instable 
system – instable in an economic but also political way. Especially because of 
the experiences people had made in the Weimar Republic, it appears that the 
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consciousness for risks of ill-led political developments was especially strong. 
Following this thesis, it would be necessary to investigate in how far this de-
bate has affected the specific organisation of the Western German welfare state. 
3.  Social Politics between the Repercussions of the War 
and the “Economic Miracle” 
Only a few years after the Federal Republic of Germany had been founded, the 
economic boom reached an unexpected level. However, Western Germany was 
by no means a stable state in its early years. Especially economic worries were 
wide-spread. One of the central tasks of the state was supporting those who had 
lost the basis of their existence because of the Second World War. Such sup-
port seemed to be necessary not only for ethical reasons. Politicians and social 
experts also considered it indispensable in order to strengthen the people’s trust 
in the new, democratic state. Discontent citizens were regarded as “politically 
fragile.”1 During the reconstruction of post-war Western Germany, the con-
sciousness for risks of a disturbance of internal order was ubiquitous. The 
contemporaries were still well aware of the situation in the Weimar Republic, 
where economic crises, political unrest and social dislocations had completely 
destabilised social order. In addition, the Cold War was already in full swing – 
and communism as a menacing bogeyman hovered over everything. (This also 
resonated in many social debates, as the CDU always suspected the SPD to 
strive for communist conditions within the social security system and later the 
whole society (Hockerts 1985, 254; Conze 2009, 172; Bohlender 2010, 102; 
Schildt 1995, 355; Lorke 2015, 79).) 
The path for social politics seemed to be pre-determined by the constitution, 
for the Federal Republic of Germany had been characterised as a sozialer 
Rechtsstaat, i.e. a social state governed by the rule of law, in the Basic Law. 
However, different ways of building such a state were favoured by different 
groups. Some strove to expand the social system, while others were convinced 
that individuals were especially capable of protecting themselves against the 
standard risks of life in times of increasing prosperity. Welfare experts agreed in 
so far as they considered the social benefits to be completely insufficient where 
they were someone’s sole income. The biggest restraint for the state to make 
comprehensive improvements in this sector was at first the tense budgetary situa-
tion (Hockerts 1980, 201). Another aspect all stakeholders agreed about was the 
necessity to get rid of the chaos which the pragmatic-reactive sociopolitics of 
the immediate post-war years had left behind (Hockerts 1985, 245). 
                                                             
1  Cf. Ihme (1955, 400); Letter from the “Deutscher Frauenring“ to Helene Wessel, October 29, 
1949, AdsD, inheritance of Helene Wessel, signature 18. 
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Thus, Konrad Adenauer stated in the autumn of 1953 in his second govern-
ment declaration that the guiding principle of the social market economy made 
it a central governmental task “to integrate the unemployed and to propose 
measures to the parliament to further improve the economic situation of pen-
sioners, disabled people, orphans and bereaved people” (Von Beyme 1979, 
81).2 Pursuing this, Adenauer focused on two things: on the one hand, further 
economic growth, including the hope for full employment, and on the other hand, 
an umfassende Sozialreform, a full-fledged social reform. The latter was in-
tended not only to unravel the chaotic web of benefits, but also to direct social 
expenses more appropriately to those who needed them (Hockerts 1985, 253). 
The concept of the Social Democrats for a social reform went further than 
the chancellor’s. In contrast to the government, the SPD considered health care 
a part of sociopolitics. Furthermore, the party emphasised the necessity of 
preventive measures. These were supposed to reduce the risk of falling into a 
precarious situation as far as possible. According to the SPD, such a compre-
hensive approach was necessary in order to grant individual freedom and digni-
ty, both of which they considered to be unattainable without social security. 
From the party’s point of view, times were insecure for two reasons, despite the 
beginning “economic miracle.” Firstly, most citizens had no savings anymore – 
due to the war, hardship as refugees and the devaluation of the currency. In 
addition to this factual loss of security, the terrible experiences people had 
made caused a perceived loss of security.3 In line with Eckart Conzes proposi-
tion to regard the history of the Federal Republic of Germany as a quest for 
security, the comprehensive socio-political approach of the SPD, focusing 
mainly on preventive measures, seemed to reveal the wish for a future in which 
some things might not be possible, a future where many things were deter-
mined and calculable (Conze 2009, 18). 
As a matter of fact, the population of Western Germany in the 1950s was 
strongly coined by experiences of poverty between the wars and after the Sec-
ond World War. Within socio-political debates, experts thus often measured 
current social problems against those of previous decades. On the one hand, 
they emphasised the enormous progress the Federal Republic had made within 
only a few years. On the other hand, they identified those previous problems as 
the root of the Western German’s desire for well-ordered conditions, social 
security and social justice. The best way of responding to this was a sociopoli-
                                                             
2  Original quote: “die Arbeitslosen einzugliedern und dem Bundestag Maßnahmen vorzu-
schlagen, durch die die wirtschaftliche Lage der Rentner, Invaliden, Waisen und Hinterblie-
benen weiter verbessert wird.” From Konrad Adenauer’s government declaration on October 
20, 1953.  
3  Pamphlet “SPD Sozialplan. Der Punkt, der jeden interessiert“ (1954/55), AdsD, inheritance of 
Ludwig Preller, signature 92. 
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cy which avoided the emergence of need as far as possible (Reucher 1999, 35; 
Conze 2009, 16). 
As Hans Günter Hockerts has pointed out, the socio-political positions of the 
SPD and Adenauer’s Christian Democrats were relatively similar on the pro-
grammatical level in the 1950s. Differences can be found with regard to accen-
tuation rather than with regard to the general goals. Neither did the SPD aim for a 
social system which replaced the individuals’ responsibility by state benefits, nor 
was the majority of the CDU opposed to an expansion of the state’s social 
security system. The CDU, too, regarded social peace as a basic condition for a 
functioning democracy (Hockerts 1980, 230 et seq.). They were also aware that 
people expected the state to guarantee a certain extent of social security since 
the introduction of Bismarck’s social legislation, and that their expectations 
had further grown because of their experiences in the previous decades. 
The guidelines for social reform, passed in 1956 during the CDU’s conven-
tion in Stuttgart, are an example for this: “Provisions which used to be required 
only by a part of the people have become common goods. Therefore they also 
need a common right.”4 Individual precaution for hard times and individual re-
sponsibility were still supposed to antecede support from the community or the 
state. Yet, socio-political measures which had proven successful for 70 years 
should be maintained. Legal rights should be respected. The guidelines also 
acknowledged that many new forms of need seemed to have evolved, and that 
these demanded not only measures of economic, financial and currency politics, 
but also socio-political reforms.5 I here use the word “seemed” not because I 
think these needs were not real in the years of the beginning “economic mira-
cle.” But in my opinion the experiences the German people had made in the 
past, especially during the 1920s, were more important for this political guide-
line than the problems they were actually confronted with in the present. 
Despite these significant parallels, strong tensions erupted in the debates of 
the 1950s. Especially the representatives of economic-liberal circles reproached 
the supporters of an expansion of the social system with promoting a Ver-
sorgungsstaat which suffocated any form of freedom and self-reliance. Ver-
sorgungsstaat cannot be translated directly into English. Without knowing the 
background it just sounds like another expression of the word “welfare state.” 
But within the socio-political debates of the 1950s and 1960s, it was actually 
mainly used as a swear word. Those who used it wanted to stress the negative 
effects of a state in which citizens do not have to worry about their social secu-
rity. To some of them, the creation of a “welfare state” already implied this 
threat. The concept of the “welfare state” had at its basis the idea of a preven-
                                                             
4  Original quote: “Sicherungen, die früher nur für einen Teil des Volkes notwendig waren, sind 
Allgemeingut geworden und bedürfen deshalb auch eines allgemeinen Rechtes.“  
5  See: Leitsätze zur Sozialreform. CDU-Parteitag Stuttgart 28.4.1956, AdsD, inheritance of 
Ludwig Preller, signature 77. See also: O.A. 1956. 
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tive sociopolitics which did not only protect individuals from existential risks 
like sickness, invalidity or unemployment, or rectified unintended develop-
ments of the economic process in hindsight. Instead, the state was supposed to 
provide its citizens with an optimum of public social benefits from the start – 
irrespective of their social and economic status. The modern welfare state was 
thus granted the right to intervene in the economy when its citizens’ welfare 
demanded it (cf. Abelshauser 1987, 9). 
In Western Germany, this opinion was initially held mainly by social-
democratic circles. In the course of the 1950s, however, it won through. Yet, 
the fear that the state could become too powerful influenced almost all socio-
political debates – on the background of German history as well as with the 
intra-German competitor in mind: the socialist system in Eastern Germany. In 
the opinion of opponents within and outside of the government, the highest 
principle of a democracy should be freedom. Social benefits were regarded as a 
threat to individual freedom as they made individuals dependent upon the state. 
These opponents of the welfare state argued that this would lead to collectivism 
and contradicted the concept of democracy. 
Sociopoliticians from within the SPD reproached the government with pur-
suing ideological and power-conscious considerations through this line of 
argument (see Schellenberg 1968, 12; also cf. Reucher 1999, 37). In how far 
this was the case cannot be clearly determined. As a matter of fact, however, 
employees of social services were confronted with problems in these years: the 
expansion of help programmes, based on an ever-expanding understanding of 
poverty risks, implied an expansion of control over those who received social 
benefits. This contradicted the notion of social work as a partnership which saw 
it as its main task to motivate those in need to help themselves. As the example 
of von Ferber at the beginning of the article has already shown, social experts 
were thus confronted with a paradox: with a continuously expanding concept of 
“being in need,” the state could intervene in an increasing number of areas of 
life – although the goal behind this was to increase people’s chances to free 
personal development through socio-political measures. This basic dilemma 
shall now be further explored, using as examples the debates about the Ver-
sorgungsstaat on the one hand and about the meaning of the constitutional 
concept of the sozialer Rechtsstaat, the social state under the rule of law, on the 
other hand. 
4.  Negative Consequences of Sociopolitics – The Debate 
about the ”Versorgungsstaat” 
The first warnings against a Versorgungsstaat could already be heard in the 
early 1950s. Although everyone agreed that the state was responsible for re-
moving the consequences of the war, it was as early as 1951 that Konrad 
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Adenauer propagated ideas that aimed at a gradual downsizing of the welfare 
state. In the aforementioned government declaration from 1953, the re-elected 
chancellor also ascribed a limited potential of social benefits in reducing pov-
erty. Not the expansion of social benefits was what he hoped would lead to 
improvements, but the reorganisation of existing measures. In addition, he 
relied on the promotion of the economy. This was supposed to further increase 
economic growth and thereby raise the prosperity of the whole society, includ-
ing those parts of the population that had hitherto been undersupplied (Schulz 
2005, 149 et seq.). 
Another leading politician who repeatedly voiced concerns about the expan-
sion of public social security benefits was Ludwig Erhard, who was minister 
for economic affairs for many years. Erhard held the opinion that individuals 
had to be liberated from poverty before they would be able to abandon the 
“materialistic way of thinking.” In other words, Erhard considered only those 
whose basic needs were fulfilled to be capable of getting involved in processes 
of civil society, e.g. volunteer work or political action like participating in 
elections or demonstrations. However, he did not want to attain this through 
social benefits, but through well-functioning economic politics and a strength-
ening of self-reliance. In Erhard’s opinion, social benefits were necessary for a 
limited period: as soon as the repercussions of the war would have been over-
come, sound economic politics and a stable democratic order would make them 
largely superfluous in the future. For this reason, he argued that the best socio-
politics was a sound economic policy (Erhard 1957, 233 et seq.). This was at 
least partly understandable, for employment and the ability to work had devel-
oped into structural characteristics of modern societies. As a consequence, full 
employment had become the most important socio-political goal from a liberal 
point of view (Bohlender 2010, 105), for it seemed to be the best protection 
against the risk of falling into poverty. 
Yet, liberalism was also connected with another conception which was fre-
quently held at the time: everyone had to provide for themselves and their 
families with the means they gained through work and inheritance. Conse-
quently, everyone was considered responsible for what happened to them. No-
one else was to be held responsible for their losses. This way of thinking is 
called the principle of liability, and it was intended to make people act with 
foresight. With respect to sociopolitics, this meant that everyone had to reckon 
with the so-called standard risks of life. Consequently, everyone was supposed 
to take precautionary measures, rather than relying on help from the state. 
According to French historian François Ewald, the principle of liability was 
the predominant paradigm of the nineteenth century. In his opinion, it was 
replaced by the paradigm of solidarity with the turn of the century (Ewald 
1998, 6). The socio-political debates depicted above, however, show that many 
politicians still promoted this principle well into the 1950s. Similar arguments 
were made again and again in the media: the journalist Heddy Neumeister of 
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the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung who was proficient in socio-political is-
sues, concluded one year after the great pension reform that sociopolitics had 
been stretched to its limit. Despite the fact that the citizens’ reactions to the 
newly introduced index-linked pension were predominantly positive, Neumeis-
ter considered the reform to have failed. Just like many opponents of the Ver-
sorgungsstaat, the social welfare state, from within the government, she argued 
that every individual should provide for their pension themselves, self-
responsibly and only supported by their families, not by the state. The sole 
exception were individual moments of distress, such as the loss of the parents. 
In such cases, the state was supposed to secure the minimum subsistence level 
by means of the poor relief (Neumeister 1958a, 1958b). 
This seems to confirm, at least in part, the suspicion social democrats al-
ways had: namely that the debate had been purposefully fuelled by the gov-
ernment in order to weaken the position of the SPD. Therefore, the SPD re-
peatedly made a stand against the notion of an alleged causality between an 
expansion of the social system and communism, which frequently resonated in 
the debate about the Versorgungsstaat. Behind this notion, Ludwig Preller, one 
of the leading social experts of the SPD, made out a vague and irrational fear 
which the political opponents purposefully played off against the politics of the 
SPD: 
A ghost has slipped into the debate about the social reform. [...] Those who see 
this ghost say: the social insurance has ‘collectivised’ the people; the result of 
this was a lack of the sense of responsibility and hence a drift towards the ‘wel-
fare state’; to fight this tendency and to help the individual to reawaken their ob-
ligatory action in freedom, the idea of ‘care’ has to regain influence within the 
system of social security. As a consequence, the existing legal claim to social 
benefits has to be replaced by poverty tests (Preller 1955).6 
Preller further argued that by insinuating that individual thought and action 
were eliminated through the great collectives, it could be suggested, without 
actually being said, that collectivism and communism were not far from one 
another. With regard to such reproaches, Preller’s comrade Walter Auerbach 
conceded that dictatorships also used social benefits to exert and legitimise 
their power. Nonetheless, he stressed that social benefits were also justified in a 
democratic state. They had to be organised differently than in a dictatorship, 
but that was, according to Auerbach, a question of “how,” not of “whether.” 
Therefore, before social benefits could be restructured, the current structural 
                                                             
6  Original quote: “Ein Gespenst hat sich in die Diskussion um die Sozialreform eingeschlichen. 
[...] Die Sozialversicherung, sagen die Gespensterseher, habe die Menschen ‘kollektiviert‘; 
daraus resultiere mangelndes Verantwortungsbewußtsein; ihm entspreche die Tendenz zum 
‘Wohlfahrtsstaat‘; um diesen zu bekämpfen und dem Individuum wieder zu verpflichtendem 
Handeln in Freiheit zu verhelfen, müsse der ‘Fürsorgegedanke‘ im System der sozialen Siche-
rung stärkeren Einfluß gewinnen. Womit folgerichtig der bestehende Rechtsanspruch auf 
soziale Leistungen durch Bedürftigkeitsprüfungen fürsorgerischer Art zu ersetzen ist.“ 
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principles of society had to be determined, and tendencies for development 
outlined (Auerbach 1956).7 
In the article these thoughts are taken from, Auerbach also described chang-
es in socio-political goals which, despite diverse forms of resistance, loomed in 
Western German post-war society. With regard to these changes, he made out 
parallels to the development in Great Britain and Scandinavia, although the 
changes in Germany were delayed (cf. Abelshauser 1987, 9). Auerbach thus 
conceived of sociopolitics as “the entirety of the scheduled measures which 
guarantee the economic existence and the dignity of the working (and the inva-
lid) people and their relatives” (Auerbach 1956).8 For Auerbach, this included 
securing the ability to work up until old age, e.g. through health care and suffi-
cient recovery. He was convinced that in an industrial society, sociopolitics 
could not be confined to helping the socially deprived. To him social benefits 
functioned as compensations for lacking income. To support this opinion, Au-
erbach even referred to the “father” of German sociopolitics, when he argued 
that Otto von Bismarck had not intended his sociopolitics to be politics for the 
poor. Rather, he thought that Bismarck already pursued the principle of preven-
tion. For health, accident and pension insurance were not meant to help poor 
people, but prevent workers from falling into poverty (Auerbach 1956). 
Thus, with regard to its socio-political ideas, the SPD relied mainly on the 
principle of prevention. The party justified its comprehensive approach with 
the universal right to lead a life in dignity, which, in their opinion, implied a 
political duty. This approach was not new. Already in the Weimar Republic, 
the notion of what sociopolitics had to encompass and affect had begun to 
change fundamentally: The goal of welfare had been supposed to be careful 
social planning instead of emergency help, and an active fight against poverty 
through prevention, rehabilitation and professional retraining programmes 
rather than managing poverty. Besides the professionalization of social work, 
the fact that people from outside the lower classes, too, could become needy of 
welfare had been essential to this change of attitude in the 1920s. As a result of 
war and inflation, not only the lowest social classes had become poor.9 A dis-
proportionately high share of the middle class had been confronted with eco-
nomic hardship due to a loss of assets, the death of the provider or unemploy-
ment. Municipalities had been no longer responsible only for the traditional care 
for the poor, but also had have to take care of war victims and disabled people, 
                                                             
7  For more information about the socio-political conflict between Ludwig Erhard and the 
social democratic milieu q.v.: O. A. (1958); Fritze (1958). 
8  Original quote: “die Gesamtheit der planmäßigen Maßnahmen, die der Sicherung der wirt-
schaftlichen Existenz und der Würde des arbeitenden (und des nicht mehr arbeitsfähigen) 
Menschen und seiner Angehörigen dient.“ 
9  As Sarah Hassdenteufel (2016, in this HSR Special Issue) shows in her article the fast grow-
ing numbers of unemployed at the beginning of the 1980s had a similar effect on the social 
security measures in France. 
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individuals with insufficient pensions as well as pregnant women and women in 
childbed (Sachße and Tennstedt 1988, 160). Because of the economic crises, 
these high expectations towards sociopolitics soon had to be lowered. In contrast 
to the Weimar Republic, stable economic growth provided the Federal Republic 
of Germany with sufficient financial means to implement these sociopolitic ideas. 
Thus, François Ewald’s assessment that the twentieth century had been dominat-
ed by the paradigm of solidarity seemed to prove true. For the principle of pre-
vention corresponds with solidarity (Ewald 1998, 22). Prevention, in turn, de-
mands science and technical control. It is about reducing the probability for 
risks to occur (Ewald 1998, 11). 
The fact that, in the socio-political debates of the 1950s, social democrats 
were not the only ones to use the term “solidarity” underlines Ewald’s position. 
Even the supporters of the principle of liability seemed to apply different 
standards, especially with regard to war victims. The events of the previous 
decades had shown that the principle of individual risk prevention stopped 
working when it came to inflation and war. President Theodor Heuss, for ex-
ample, demanded in 1955 that society offer more support to the elderly. He 
argued that the elderly who now had to stand in line in front of nursing homes 
were the ones who had been affected the most by the World Wars, for they had 
lost their savings through the currency reform. In some cases, they had lost 
them for the second time. According to Heuss, a fresh start was not possible for 
them (Heuss 1955, 348). Newspapers also called people’s attention to the fact 
that many contemporaries considered it a blatant injustice that people who had 
fallen into poverty because of government decisions still lived in want in the 
times of the “economic miracle” (see e.g. Author Unknown 1955c).10 
The example of the Christian Democrat Theoder Blank shows that the warn-
ings against an excessive expansion of the welfare state were based on actual 
concerns on the part of the political actors, not just political strategy. In gen-
eral, Blank, who was minister for employment and social order from 1957 to 
1965, supported the expansion of the welfare state for reasons of Christian re-
sponsibility. Yet, he was convinced that there was no need for the state to regu-
late areas which those who were fit to work and in good health were able to take 
care of for themselves and their families. In Blank’s opinion, the development in 
the GDR proved that sociopolitics could also function as oppressive power poli-
tics and was therefore not innately good.  
Economic policy is able to eliminate hunger and to create wealth on its own, 
as the past has shown quite clearly, but this does not automatically decrease 
dependence and increase freedom. These improvements must be effected by, 
                                                             
10  For sources where the author is unknown, the abbreviation A. u. will be used in the following. 
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it takes politicians with social expertise through careful consideration and cor-
rective intervention (Blank 1958).11 
Blank acknowledged that full employment and a stable currency were the ma-
terial foundation of sociopolitics. Yet, he thought that public measures of wel-
fare and protection had to help everyone who was unable to take care of them-
selves alone because of sickness, old age, invalidity or a stroke of fate. As one 
reason for his views he referred to human dignity which to him based on the 
opportunity to free personal development. He thought that this was impossible 
in a Versorgungsstaat. To him, such a state also implied the danger of neglect-
ing those who worked hard and encourage idleness, which ultimately impeded 
the ascent of society as a whole and thus prevented social progress. Moreover, 
he argued that social benefits were unfair because they hit especially the work-
ing classes in the pocket. On the other hand, he referred to the “alten sozialen 
Gedanken der Nächstenliebe und der Solidarität,” the old social ideas of com-
passion and solidarity, when it came to expanding social security for those who 
had no way of helping themselves.12 
Blank’s assertions partly followed Erhard’s notion, but they also recall the 
position of Walter Auerbach. For, with reference to the Christian image of 
humanity, Blank warned against the danger of collectivism as well as the dan-
ger of excessive individualism and liberalism. In his opinion, the community 
provided the precondition for the individual’s physical and spiritual existence 
and their moral development.13 Although the Minister for Employment’s opin-
ion resembled Auerbach’s, he did not want to be associated with social demo-
cratic ideas. For at the end of the 1950s, the SPD was still suspected of striving 
for a socialist system.14 In a 1960 speech, Blank emphasised that Christianity, 
rather than Marxism, had been the hotbed of Germany’s sociopolitics with its 
labour legislation, its occupational safety rules and its principle of social securi-
ty. He argued that both Protestant and Catholic reformers had provided the 
impulses for these measures and had influenced their implementation signifi-
cantly. Consequently, he argued, the social democrats had no “right of primo-
                                                             
11  Original quote: “Hunger beseitigen und Wohlstand schaffen, das vermag die Wirtschaftspo-
litik allein, wie wir eindringlich erfahren haben; Abhängigkeit mindern aber und Freiheit 
mehren, das fällt nicht automatisch mit ab, das muß mit Überlegung und Weitsicht vom 
Sozialpolitiker absichtsvoll bewirkt und korrigierend herbeigeführt werden.“ 
12  Speech on “Sozialpolitik aus christlicher Verantwortung“ held by Theodor Blank in Fulda on 
March 5, 1960, ACDP, 1-098 026/1. 
13  Speech by Theodor Blank, delivered on the meeting of the “Junge Union” in Berlin on Octo-
ber 3, ADCP, 01-098 002/1. 
14  The deputy of the German Party, Margot Kalinke, for example imputed to the social demo-
crats, that they did not really want freedom for individuals. She thought that they just 
wanted to replace the dependence from employers by the dependence from public authori-
ties. Indeed this was before the political convention of Bad Godesberg. Manuscript of Mar-
got Kalinke’s speech on social policy in the third legislative period (probably 1957), ACDP, 
01-026 012/1. 
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geniture” with regard to sociopolitics. To the contrary, he claimed that they had 
initially been opposed to sociopolitics.15 
The Minister of Employment thus lined out a continuity in Christian socio-
politics from Bismarck’s time until the present. This way, he attempted to both 
legitimise Christian sociopolitics against doubters from within his own party, 
and to establish it as superior to the SPD’s sociopolitics. To him, the underly-
ing anthropology was the key aspect of sociopolitics. In his opinion, many 
politicians, namely those within the SPD, had lost track of this, thinking only in 
money and benefits. Welfare experts within the CDU, on the contrary, made 
the Christian conception of the human being, which demanded them to fight 
poverty, the basis of their sociopolitics. 
However, Blank argued that the social preconditions had changed since the 
Bismarck era. Differently than in the nineteenth century, when being on some-
one’s payroll was virtually tantamount to living in poverty, in his opinion the 
society of the Federal Republic was a workers’ society with growing economic 
opportunities and a remarkable security against the vicissitudes of life (Wech-
selfällen des Lebens). To Blank, history had long overcome the poor, exploited 
worker who was at danger of misery every day. Therefore, he argued that there 
was no need for the state to watch over every individual’s wellbeing like a 
fortress. For this would mean patronising people and making them objects of 
state welfare. 
He indirectly reproached the SPD with having such an attitude. Yet, he con-
ceded that the social security system still had flaws which needed removing, 
although he did not see this as a general problem, but rather as individual cases. 
The values he wanted to govern the Federal Republic’s sociopolitics were a sense 
of responsibility, a public spirit and the will to self-help. Essentially, Blank stuck 
to these views during his time as minister of employment, although towards the 
end of his tenure, he argued more frequently that sociopolitics had to be restricted 
for financial reasons. Again and again, he raged against a patronising authori-
tarian state (bevormundenden Obrigkeitsstaat) and a welfare state of com-
munist character (Versorgungsstaat kommunistischer Prägung). Occasionally, 
he even identified the one with the other. At the same time, he emphasised in a 
1964 speech that there “still [remained] a lot of coy and hopeless hardship”16 
and that sociopolitics also had to pay attention to development aid.17 
In comparison to Ludwig Erhard, the ministry of employment held a moder-
ate position. Nonetheless, politicians from within the SPD struggled vehement-
ly against what they called “Blank’s policy of the restriction of the welfare 
                                                             
15  Here and below speech on “Sozialpolitik aus christlicher Verantwortung“ held by Theodor 
Blank in Fulda on March 5, 1960, ACDP, 1-098 026/1. 
16  Original quote: “noch viel verschämte und resignierte Not.” 
17  Speech by Theodor Blank on prevailing questions of social policy, held in Fulda on June 5, 
1964, ACDP, 1-098 004/1. 
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state.”18 Interestingly, they, too, used the risk of a collapse of the democratic 
order to lend weight to their standpoint. The difference was: they thought that 
an insufficient, rather than an excessive, amount of social security guaranteed 
by the state was the cause for this risk. They referred to the German experienc-
es in the past in order to support their argument: “The tragic fate of the Weimar 
Republic has shown that democracy will be in danger if it is not socially se-
cured.”19 Therefore, they argued, a democratic state had to protect health and 
workforce, create appropriate working conditions, improve career opportuni-
ties, create an effective equalisation of burdens within families, and ensure 
sufficient social security to elderly and sick people as well as in the case of 
accidents or the provider’s death. According to them, the prosperity of industri-
al society only served the people once a welfare state had been implemented. 
The SPD tried to legitimise their position in two ways: firstly, they claimed 
that the majority of the population, at least within the working classes, backed the 
party’s socio-political goals. Secondly, they referenced the Basic Law which 
characterised the Federal Republic of Germany as a sozialer Rechtsstaat (a 
social state under the rule of law). This state, they argued, had to ensure the 
basic conditions for everyone to strive for a healthy, productive and humane 
life. According to the SPD, much had been achieved in this regard, but the 
boundaries of the welfare state had by no means been exhausted, for hardship 
continued to exist in the Federal Republic.20 
Despite the differences in language, the position of the ministry of employ-
ment under Theodor Blank was remarkably similar to that of the SPD. Both 
sides argued in favour of a public guarantee of basic social security, i.e. an 
expansion of social benefits. Both sides, if with different intensities, warned 
against an excessive limitation of individual freedom through state interven-
tions (Cf. e.g. A. u. 1956; Auerbach 1956). In addition, the leading experts for 
sociopolitics within the SPD agreed with the ministry of employment about the 
notion that the legal right to social benefits had to be respected. Most notably, 
they both believed that annuity claims and benefits from the national insuranc-
es had to be paid out regardless of the individual’s need, even when they were 
(partly) funded by public grants. The ministry of finance, on the contrary, 
aimed to reduce spending for social benefits by limiting them to those whose 
need had been proven. 
The ministry of employment, however, intended to delineate especially the 
benefits from national insurances from the stigmatised forms of traditional poor 
                                                             
18  Original quote: “Blanks Politik der Begrenzung des Sozialstaates.“ 
19  Original quote: “Das tragische Schicksal der Weimarer Republik hat gezeigt, daß es um die 
Demokratie schlecht bestellt ist, wenn sie nicht sozial gesichert ist.“ Pamphlet “Sozialpolitik 
in unserer Zeit“ by the social democratic party (1961), AdsD, inheritance Ludwig Preller, sig-
nature 94. 
20  Ibid. 
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relief, for which reason they vehemently rejected testing people’s need before 
benefits were paid out to them. Similarly, they wanted annuity claims – for a 
long period, the largest share were compensation payments for consequential 
damages from the war – to be paid out regardless of the recipient’s economic 
situation. To them, the rule of law demanded that compensation rather than 
need was the principle behind benefits for consequences of the war, as Ernst 
Schellenberg put it in 1967. In their opinion, these benefits thereby contributed 
to the equalisation within Western German society. Eventually, the SPD and 
the ministry of employment prevailed.21 
5.  Expansion of the Welfare State on the Basis of the 
Basic Law 
The denomination of the Federal Republic as a social state governed by the rule 
of law was the positive counterpart to the notion of the Versorgungsstaat. The 
concept stood at the centre of the social democrats’ argument. In their opinion, 
social risks like invalidity had always represented a challenge to society. Yet, 
the necessary support used to be provided by relatives, neighbours or the com-
munity – until the end of the eighteenth century, when the transition to industrial 
capitalist society entailed a change in the criteria for social security and social 
risk (Roos 2012, 53 et seq.). In pre-industrial societies, social insecurity was 
higher for individuals who did not belong to a community, e.g. a guild of crafts-
men. In industrial capitalist societies, however, individuals were threatened with 
losing their social status when they became incapable of providing for them-
selves through work. The continuous dissolution of traditional networks and 
ties through industrialisation, the emergence of the working class movement, 
and the effects of the economic crises of the modern era had contributed to this 
development, so that social security increasingly became a matter of being able 
to work (Bohlender 2010, 105). In the nineteenth century, this led to structural 
poverty. Because of this, the notion of social right emerged in the second half 
of the century. Nonetheless, private and public help for the poor was not de-
duced from citizenship until the end of the German Empire, but rather quite the 
opposite: until the downfall of the German monarchy, citizens who had to 
make use of poor relief lost the right to vote, as well as other civil rights. A real 
consciousness for the social dimension of citizenship was only created by the 
catastrophes experienced by Germans in the wake of the World Wars. They 
thus paved the way for the emergence of the modern welfare states (Maul 1955, 
                                                             
21  E.g. Press releases and information: statement from Ernst Schellenberg on “Social policy 
today,“ February 24, 1967, AdsD, inheritance Ernst Schellenberg, signature 3. Cf. Hockerts 
1985, 255. 
HSR 41 (2016) 1  │  192 
115, 117 et seq.). It was especially in the second half of the twentieth century 
that expectations towards the state emerged on the part of the citizens (Bohlen-
der 2010, 102, 105). 
Pointing to the determinations of the Basic Law, the social democrats in the 
1950s defended themselves against the accusation of striving for a welfare state 
of socialist character. Yet, the Basic Law had been reluctant to specify social 
entitlements and guidelines in the form of constitutional norms. The Weimar 
Constitution had contained such norms, yet it was well established that these 
could not always be realised. Thus, the Basic Law only contained a Sozi-
alstaatsklausel: the constitution committed to the democratic and social federal 
state (demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat) in article 20, section 1, and to 
the democratic and social state governed by the rule of law (demokratischer 
und sozialer Rechtsstaat) in article 28, section 1 (Kaufmann 2001, 72). 
From the latter article, vague as it is, together with the dignity of man guar-
anteed in article 1, the social democrats deduced a public responsibility for the 
individual’s social security, and from their understanding of democracy the 
principles of integration and equal opportunity. According to the SPD, modern 
sociopolitics had to be guided by the principle of prevention. To them, socio-
politics was structural politics, which meant it had to be designed in such a way 
that disadvantages did not occur in the first place. Furthermore, they argued 
that sociopolitics must not be subordinated to economic and fiscal goals be-
cause, according to them, all political aims concerned the society as a whole. 
Thus, they wanted the different measures to be co-ordinated. They believed 
that the ‘social state governed by the rule of law’ had not yet been achieved, 
although Western Germany had emerged “out of the boundless poverty and the 
burdensome restrictedness of all living conditions in the time immediately 
following the collapse at the end of the war,”22 as Ludwig Preller put it, and 
although the socio-political status from the Weimar Republic had been restored 
since the foundation of the Western German state, even breaking new socio-
political ground in certain aspects. “The Federal Republic of Germany will 
only become a ‘democratic and social state under the rule of law’ when the 
spirit of solidarity and the spirit of equality pervade all sectors of the FRG, 
from the workplace through to high policy.”23 
During the remainder of the 1960s, the SPD more and more frequently used 
the notion of equal opportunity to phrase their central socio-political goal. Ernst 
                                                             
22  Original quote: “[a]us der grenzenlosen Armut und aus der drückenden Beschränktheit aller 
Lebensumstände der Zeit unmittelbar nach dem Zusammenbruch zu Kriegsende.” 
23  Original quote: “‘Demokratischer und sozialer Rechtsstaat‘ wird die Bundesrepublik erst 
werden, wenn der Geist des Sozialen, der Geist der Gleichberechtigung, wenn dieser Geist 
alle Sektoren der Bundesrepublik, vom Arbeitsplatz angefangen bis in die hohe Politik hin-
ein, durchzieht und erfüllt.” Presentation by Ludwig Preller on the conference of the Ger-
man Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) in Hanau on January 23 and 24, 1960, AdsD, inher-
itance Ludwig Preller, signature 32; see also Preller (1963). 
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Schellenberg, who was the party’s leading figure in sociopolitics from the middle 
of the 1950s through the 1970s (Lange 2007, 25; Hockerts 1980, 318), pro-
claimed equal opportunity to be amongst the prior tasks of sociopolitics, along-
side health care, the promotion of capital formation and securing the economic 
status of broad social strata.24 Schellenberg’s objection to his party’s plans to 
raise telephone charges in 1973 illustrates his efforts to enable everyone to 
partake in society: he argued that these plans were highly questionable with re-
gard to the elderly and disabled, for many of whom the telephone was an indis-
pensable means to stay in touch with their environment. In Schellenberg’s opin-
ion, raising the charges thus contradicted the government’s policy statement.25 
Many conservative politicians, by contrast, emphasised that the constitu-
tional principle of the social state governed by the rule of law placed individual 
freedom, rather than the state, in the centre of law and politics. They argued 
that political order as a whole was dominated by the continuous antagonism 
between freedom and constraint, between individual and community, which 
became especially apparent in sociopolitics. In their opinion, these antagonisms 
had to be balanced out. They resisted the call for an expansion of social juris-
diction because they believed that since the 1960s, at the latest, consolidating 
the status quo and securing it for the future was what needed to be done, now 
that widespread distress had been resolved.26 
Despite this resistance, social security was juridified more and more. Even 
the final social safety net of poor relief, which had been strongly restricted and 
immensely dependent on the individual administrative clerk’s judgement until 
the 1950s, was standardised more and more and, at the same time, handled 
more liberally. While those who applied for poor relief were still expected to 
prove their need and to pay the benefits back later, these rules were now ap-
plied less strictly. The obligation to pay back benefits was omitted altogether 
through the passing of the Bundessozialhilfegesetz in 1961. Politicians from 
within the SPD especially fought for the fixation of the legal entitlement to 
poor relief (see e.g. Lange 2007, 23). They argued that social security was a 
prerequisite for the freedom of choice, and thus for democratic participation 
(see e.g. Dalberg 1957). 
The Federal Administrative Court had created de facto-right to poor relief 
through a verdict in 1954. However, it was not laid down by law until several 
                                                             
24  Manuscript of the speech on “Aufgaben der sozialdemokratischen Politik“ from 1965, AdsD, 
inheritance Ernst Schellenberg, signature 2; q.v. comment about social policy from Novem-
ber 25, 1968, AdsD, inheritance Ernst Schellenberg, signature 4; Statement on social policy 
in the German Federal Republic from October 1970, AdsD, inheritance Ernst Schellenberg, 
signature 5. 
25  Manuscript of Ernst Schellenberg’s speech on November 16, 1973, AdsD, inheritance Ernst 
Schellenberg, signature 7. 
26  Manuscript of Margot Kalinke’s speech on sociopolitics (probably 1964), ACDP, 01-026 
012/1. 
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years later, in the Bundessozialhilfegesetz in 1961. The court had avoided to get 
involved in the organisation of poor relief. The social welfare offices thus 
retained a certain discretion concerning the appropriate level of benefits for the 
individual applicant – although indicative rates, based on a scientifically 
grounded market basket system had been established (Neumeister 1956). What 
the court had determined was the right of those in need to file a suit when they 
considered the rejection of their application for poor relief to be unjustified. 
This made a previous notion obsolete which stemmed from Prussian poverty 
legislation: until well into the 1950s, public poor relief had been considered a 
means to secure public order, rather than being granted to individuals for their 
own sake. Thus, altogether, the position of those in need was strengthened (A. 
u. 1954; Gerstung 1955; Schrapper 1993, 208). 
In its reasoning, the court based its decision on two things: the change in so-
cio-ethical value judgements on the one hand, and the transformation of the 
legal preconditions through the Basic Law on the other hand. According to the 
court, the earlier had started already in the Weimar Republic, yet without af-
fecting the traditional legal conception. And even after 1945, jurisdiction had 
stuck to these old conceptions, although the economic and social circumstances 
had changed fundamentally. The court argued that these traditional conceptions 
were no longer sustainable, all the more after the Basic Law had come into 
effect. On the one hand, the dignity of man forbids treating individuals as noth-
ing more than objects of state action. Rather than subjects, individuals were 
now citizens, which was reflected, amongst other things, in the fact that recipi-
ents of poor relief did not have the right to vote revoked, as had been the case 
in German Empire. On the other hand, the court argued, the Basic Law had 
defined the Federal Republic as a social state governed by the rule of law. Any 
relationship between citizens and the state was thus a legal relationship. By 
using the adjective “social,” the constitution had furthermore pointed to the 
idea of community and the social obligation that came with property. Conse-
quently, the citizens, as participants of the community, now had rights of their 
own, from which the court deduced a fundamental right to life and health.27 
In professional circles, the verdict of 1954 had been received with mixed 
feelings. Social security offices raised doubts because their actions were still 
governed by the legally granted discretion, but could be examined by courts 
once someone had filed a suit. The social security offices claimed that courts 
hereby became a supervisory authority of the administration. An organisation 
which was close to the SPD, the Arbeiterwohlfahrt, was sceptical as well when 
it came to the practical value of the verdict. An article in the Neues Beginnen; 
the periodical of the Arbeiterwohlfahrt, clearly welcomed the fact that those in 
need were no longer objects of state action, but could demand their rights in 
                                                             
27  Ibid. 
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court. At the same time, the verdict did not place any new duties on the social 
security offices. It merely determined that those in need were entitled to sup-
port from the social security offices, and had the right to go to administrative 
court when they were of the opinion that the office had unlawfully refused their 
request for poor relief. However, the author argued that the court had not ques-
tioned the principles of subsidiarity and individualisation, which provided the 
authorities with substantial discretion. Courts could only intervene when the 
authorities transcended or abused this discretion, e.g. when clerks neglected the 
market basket system (Gerstung 1955). 
As a matter of fact, the following years provide several examples which 
show that jurisdiction struggled with the idea of granting everyone in need, 
even the allegedly “unworthy,” the right to poor relief. Problems occurred for 
example with “work dodgers.” As late as 1960, the Higher Administrative 
Courts thus fought about the question whether it was legal to refuse poor relief 
to those who rejected a job they had been offered. While the Higher Adminis-
trative Court in Münster decided that someone in need who was unwilling to 
work was no longer to be considered “in need,” the courts in Lüneburg, Berlin 
and Bavaria argued that poor relief for those unwilling to work could be limited 
to a minimum which just about sufficed for survival, but must never be with-
drawn completely (Zabel 1960). 
Christian welfare organisations, which were traditionally close to the Chris-
tian democrats, were also sceptical of a legally granted right to poor relief. The 
principles of juridification and bureaucratisation were, for large parts of their 
staff, incompatible with the Christian notion of welfare. In their opinion, legal 
regulations implied the risk of reducing individuals to objects or even “collec-
tive beings.” At the same time, they did not exclude anyone from the right to 
poor relief because to them, Christian anthropology implied that everyone who 
needed help had to be treated as a creature of God because God had created 
man in his image (Suhr 1957).28 
6.  Conclusion 
However, referring to Peter Itzen’s and Simone Müller’s claim in the introduc-
tion to this HSR Special Issue, Beck’s assumption that modernising processes 
often produce unintended negative effects turned out to be a fruitful starting 
point for analysing the debates on social risks in the 1950s’ FRG. It sensitized 
me to the fact that the contemporaries were well aware that the expansion of 
the welfare state not only reduces the risk of poverty. They also knew about the 
                                                             
28  Cf. Speech by Theodor Blank delivered at the meeting of the “Junge Union” in Berlin on 
October 3, 1958, ADCP, 01-098 002/1. 
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negative consequences of their actions and tried to weigh up between the desire 
for social security and the value of individual freedom. So, as Arwen P. Mohun 
already argued the concept of “risk society” does not only fit for the “second 
modernity.” It is worth working with it also for earlier historical periods. In 
case of the 1950s FRG this approach sensibilised for the big unsecurity con-
temporaries felt because of the bad experiences they had made in the past, not 
only with the economic system of rampant capitalism but also with statual 
power and the handling of human rights. While social democrats chiefly argued 
that publicly guaranteed social security was a prerequisite of a functioning 
democracy, representatives of economic-liberal circles predominantly stressed 
the potential threat to individual freedom. Different hybrid forms existed be-
tween the two poles of “individual freedom” on the one side and “social securi-
ty” on the other side. 
With regard to rhetorical controversies, the expansion of the welfare state 
was a highly contested and emotionally charged issue. Most socio-political de-
bates in the second half of the 1950s were dominated by reciprocal reproaches: 
the conservatives suspected the social democrats of striving for communism, who 
in turn accused the conservatives of disregarding the definition of the Federal 
Republic as a social state in the Basic Law. Only in the 1960s did these these 
reproaches slowly subside. Despite the many warnings against an excessive 
empowerment of the state, the expansion of the welfare state was eventually a 
consensual goal. For the previous decades had proven unmistakably that the risk 
of falling into poverty continued to exist for everyone: individuals had no way of 
protecting themselves against economic crises, inflation and the consequential 
damages of wars. It seemed that public social security systems were the only 
thing that could preserve citizens from the risk of social descent. 
The Federal Republic thus saw an unforeseen heyday of the welfare state in 
the years of the “economic miracle”: from the introduction of child benefits in 
1954 to the great pensions reform in 1957 to substantial improvements in public 
welfare (Bundessozialhilfegesetz, 1961) and training assistance (BAföG, 1971) 
– although the fiercest opposition against the welfare state sometimes came 
from within the respective governments. The reasons for this were manifold: 
compared to other states, Western Germany was faced with especially strong 
consequences of the war. Developments in demography and the economical 
structure added to this, for the growing share of elderly and of employed people 
raised the number of members of social insurance. Moreover, an extended 
understanding of social rights seemed to have established itself. Furthermore, 
continuous economic growth enlarged the financial room for manoeuvre, which 
the governments used to meet the voters’ wish for more social security. Behind 
all this, it must not be forgotten that in its early years, the Federal Republic was 
far from being a stable political system. Sociopolitics was an important tool of 
legitimising, and winning the citizens’ trust in, democracy, especially because 
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of the competitive situation between Western Germany and the GDR (Hockerts 
2011, 68; Conze 2009, 172).  
Nonetheless, as this article has shown, the basic conflict of freedom versus 
security dominated the sociopolitical debates of the 1950s. Now the question is: 
What was the effect of this debate? Indeed at this point it cannot be discussed. 
But for future researches it seems to be worth to think about the influence of 
this conflict on the specific arrangements in Western German sociopolitics, e.g. 
the emphasis on the insurance principle, the promotion of the nuclear family as 
the standard family, and the strong position of Christian welfare organisations. 
Path dependence is only one of several reasons for the implementation of these 
traditional forms of social protection. The outline of the debate on the welfare 
state has shown that while ideological demarcations against the respective 
political opponent did play a role, the citizens of Western Germany actually 
were well aware of the negative consequences of direct welfare measures that 
granted the state excessive power over the individual’s way of living.  
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